within the mental hospital than in the 'outside world' and peptic ulcer was correlated with manic psychosis and the excited phase of schizoaffective psychosis. From Slorach's study of skin patients in several British mental hospitals, Ross also calculated that pompholyx had similar statistical associations to peptic ulcer.
These mental hospital surveys are mentioned in order to raise a question regarding Eastwood's broad generalization from his data. No diagnoses of schizophrenic psychosis were made for his index cases. This is not surprising since they were all at least 40 years of age. The rare schizophrenic above 39 who was not in hospital may not have been participating in the screening study or may have had neither zero nor a high number of positive answers to the CMI questions. My point is this: Eastwood's prevalence rates for physical and 'psychosomatic' disorders are not in relation to all types of mental illness.
This was a superb doctoral thesis for the University of Edinburgh, but, as a classical psychiatric monograph, the book would be more appropriately ( It has been recognized by authors such as Wittkower and Prince that comparative methods give a strong push to psychiatric understanding and conceptualization, helping to "... distinguish the essential and universal from the peripheral" and parochial" (5) . A theoretical framework for comparative psychiatry seems to be a theoretical framework for psychiatry as a whole. Yap feels in this way: he intends to provide a theoretical framework in order to secure the weak scientific foundations of psychiatry, and states that a frame of reference is "... essential to help properly circumscribe our observation, minimize personal bias, identify problems, inspire theory and establish methods." These epistemological aspects of this compact monograph will be emphasized in this review. Comparative psychiatry, inasmuch as it is an offspring of clinical psychiatry" , is " ... basically interested in the individual patient." It is well known that there is no science of the individual as such. So Yap has to assume, as science always does, general regulations of form and process in the most varied individuals. He submits that the universality of psychopathological manifestations is rooted in common human psychobiological functions This assumption of uniformity makes possible the use of analogy, the fundamental tool of scientific progress. He states that " . .. without a realistic basis for drawing analogies, to begin with, there can be no possibility of comparative psychiatric investigation. " The comparative approach is interested in both the similarities and the differences in what is functionally equivalent: the behaviour of individuals in different groups, meeting basic biological and human needs.
The task also requires basic constructs defining a frame of reference: " ... a set of constructs within which, without reductive transformation, we can work out explanations for the observed phenomena." Hypotheses, developed on the basis of analogies and constructs, are tested by appropriate research procedures provided by the logic of the framework. Incidentally Yap warns against a mechanistic reductionism to which statistical procedure for analysing human experience usually leads. He thinks that the methods of the natural sciences are not necessarily the most appropriate nor the most important in this field. Instead, he feels that" ... scientific advance depends on categorizing phenomena" and on the subsequent controlled variation of these categories in analysing reciprocal relationships among them.
As with science in general, comparative psychiatry cannot progress without the use of classification. Its goals "... can be grasped and fruitfully shared only through orderly and judicious appeal to the principles of nosology. " Yap considers humiliatory to psychiatry the relative lack of consensus in conceptualizing and classifying mental illness. This semantic confusion derives mainly from simultaneously applying principles of different levels (etiology, psychopathology, symptomatology). The lack of consensus applies to Yap's cardinal diagnostic category regarding comparative psychiatry, the psychogenic psychosis, and consequently applies also to one of its types, the 'culture bound syndrome' (5) .
These 'culture bound psychoses' have two phases. The first, rather biological, is the personality disruption (Kretchsner's "primitive reaction") provoked by powerful affective arousal. The second is the adaptative reorganizing of the individual under the pervasive influence of social expectancy. The first phase is the similarity,' the second is the difference in these forms of psychogenic psychosis, the principal subject matter of comparative psychiatry.
Inasmuch as this syndrome manifests coping and self-actualizing forces, the question of the concept of normality arises. Yap again rejects the statistical and relativistic approach, and adopts the causal functional criteria, which defines abnormality in universal terms. Taking into account biological aspects, this approach views the " ... behaviour historically in judging whether or not it is successfully coping." Yap is clear -mental illness leads to suffering and subjective restriction of choice and endangers self-actualization. It is interesting that Szasz's concern regarding the methods and the conceptual framework of medicine leads him in a different direction. While Yap tries to overcome the difficulties of our complex field through the building of a theoretical framework, Szasz's antipsychiatry, denying this possibility, can be regarded as a retreat.
Yap's methodological efforts can be put in the developmental line of those initiated by Jaspers, and cogently worked by General System Theorists (GST). Jaspers in his General Psychopathology tries to make psychopathology a science through the statements of general principles, claims that phenomenologically the same psychopathological elements are found in differing cultures -the differences lie only in the content that derives from the cultural equipment of the specific group to which the individual belongs; and like Yap, Jaspers feels that observation and results expressed in figures and curves are not enough -what is also needed is valid thinking, without which we are condemmed to" ... work away in sterile repetition" (4). This brings order, creates categories, and differentiates between what matters and what does not. For him the main problem is to find those methods which will help to construct models and " ... create the configurations whereby reality can be properly structured and comprehended" (4). 'Properly' means here 'non-reductivistic', inasmuch as Jaspers thinks that " ... human beings transcend their own empirical human self, which is the only self that scientific research can recognize and grasp" (4).
The general system approach intends to overcome the limits Jaspers draws for the scientific grasp of human beings. Bertalanffy defines GST as "... scientific exploration of 'wholes' and 'wholeness' which, not so long ago, were considered to be metaphysical notions transcending the boundaries of science" (1) . The influence of this trend on Yap is manifest in his conception of the organism as an 'open system' preponderantly motivated by " ... active striving to actualize and fulfill itself" or " ... capable of inner growth over and beyond its attempts to satisfy basic needs." Along with the concept of open system, introduced by Bertalanffy, Yap is referring to one of the two essential insights which, according to the founder of GST, " ... formulate a reorientation in psychiatry" (2) the organism as an active system, including self-realization and creativity. The second insight, mentioned by Bertalanffy, is also present in Yap's monograph -the multidimensional approach to illness, namely to psychogenic psychosis. Its historical roots in psychiatry can be traced to Birnbaum (pathogenic and pathoplastic factors) and Kretchsner (biologically preformed reactions to stress).
In the Introduction to General Systems Theory and Psychiatry, it is stated that " ... the crisis of psychiatry is that it needs to find new concepts ... to survive as a competent, scientific and humanistic servant of man" (3).
We much regret the untimely death of Dr. Pow Meng Yap, which deprived psychiatry of a man entitled and disposed to face its permanent crisis. But This volume presents a carefully executed study comparing subjective experiences of therapists and patients in the course of psychotherapy by means of factorized questionnaires completed by both immediately after psychotherapy sessions.
The participants were sixty female patients and seventeen therapists of both sexes. The therapists were mostly of eclectic orientation, and the sessions generally occurred at weekly intervals. The authors pursue a high level of accuracy and strive for freedom from bias and ambiguity. They explain that despite many studies of psychotherapy very few others (they cite only two) compare with theirs in aim and methodology. They analyse the therapy relationship pattern in terms of subject matter, feeling process, the hopes and intentions of the participants and the development of the therapy session. The much detailed questionnaire data were analysed sequentially in terms of individual report items, the items within 'facets', then inter-facet or global dimensions of experience. Lastly they produced dimensions of conjoint experience within twenty-eight patient-therapist dyads. Eleven global experience dimensions were derived for patterns of the experience of patients and therapists.
The book is aimed primarily at therapists and researchers. Therapists may find it interesting that they scored particularly well in perceiving their patients' contribution to active therapy, quite well (twelve of forty items) regarding 'feelings' but not nearly as well on items on the patients' aims and behaviour. For example, the therapist's perception of the patient as wanting to gain insight showed a greater correspondence to the patient's wish to win the therapist's respect rather than a wish to get help from the therapist. Therapists may also find such information useful in assessing the basis on which they draw conclusions about events in therapy. For the researcher the book provides full details of the structure, methods and content of the study, and suggests many related studies could be carried out apart from pure replication on other population samples.
. Since the patients were mostly of high school or university education level this approach seems a tedious and roundabout way to obtain data on what they felt was happening in their sessions. Some parts were hard to read, for example: "Our
